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Remarks:

Per our conversation, attached is an excerpt from the Congressional Record of 13 Sept. on the Montoya amendment to the Defense procurement authorization act which would require withdrawal of U. S. forces from IndoChina within 4 months after Vietnamese presidential elections unless the President reports to the Congress a finding that democratic processes have been followed. Obviously there has been a key omission in the printing of the actual amendment in the Record. The omission occurs at the end of the ":" at the end of subsection 505 (b) (clipped), and the missing language is on the attached separate sheet.

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ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this time, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR MANSFIELD TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately after the recognition of the leadership on tomorrow, I be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR HOLLINGS TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, following my remarks tomorrow morning, that the distinguished Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEATH OF SENATOR WINSTON L. PROUTY OF VERMONT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on my own time now, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN).

Mr. SCOTT. And if the Senator from Vermont needs more time, I shall be happy to yield it to him on my time.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, for 33 years, WINSTON PROUTY devoted most of his time to public service on the local, State, and National scene.

Eight of these years were served in the U.S. House of Representatives and nearly 13 in the U.S. Senate.

During the 21 years in the U.S. Congress, WIN devoted much of his time to urging assistance to the needy and underprivileged people of this Nation, the sick, the poor, and those in need of educational opportunity.

His record in this field is outstanding.

Last Friday, September 10, his distinguished career came to an end.

The omnipotent power which mankind has never been able to fathom or define and which controls the course and destiny of every one of us, called for my colleague WIN PROUTY to come home.

Since I expect there will be a time set aside for Members of this Senate to pay their respects to our devoted colleague on this floor, I will say no more at this time.

Mrs. Aiken joins me in extending to Mrs. Prouty and the members of the Prouty family our deepest sympathy.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President—

Mr. MANSFIELD. If the distinguished minority leader will yield momentarily, and the Senator from Vermont will yield me the remainder of my time, just to join the distinguished Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN) in the remarks he

has just expressed about our late beloved colleague, Senator WINSTON L. PROUTY, I would say we will miss him; we will miss WIN PROUTY because of his many outstanding contributions which his senior colleague has just enumerated.

Most especially, I should say that Senator PROUTY held a large place in his heart for the older citizens of this country. He was their advocate and friend. He worked consistently and tirelessly to bring about the betterment of their lives, and the improvement of their condition in our society. No Member of this body understood better or appreciated more the needs of older Americans.

We will all miss him. His will be a place most difficult to fill. His work for educational improvements, and his efforts to better the health and welfare of all Americans are a legacy of great distinction. WINSTON PROUTY of Vermont served his Nation with deep devotion and high integrity. His loss is profound; it will be felt in the days, weeks, months, and years ahead. I certainly join in extending the condolences of this institution to his wife and loved ones.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, first, I should like to say, so that the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will show it, that those Senators who find it possible to make arrangements to be in Vermont on Wednesday next, will, I hope, notify the appropriate Senate officials so that arrangements can be made for them to attend the funeral of Senator PROUTY. I am sure that is what the distinguished majority leader would wish also.

Mr. President, at a later date I shall have more to say about my good friend and colleague, WIN PROUTY.

We served in the House together. We came over here to the Senate on the same day. There were three of us on this side of the aisle who came over as new Senators then, Senator PROUTY, Senator Keating of New York, and myself.

WIN PROUTY and I were associated for a long time together. We were longtime friends. I was tremendously devoted to him and his dear wife.

We miss him sorely. A very fine and wonderful man has gone on to his reward.

At some future time, we will all have an opportunity to pay a more adequate tribute to him.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I send to the desk two resolutions and ask for their prompt consideration.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The first resolution will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read the resolution as follows:

S. RES. 165

Resolved, That the Senate has heard with profound sorrow and deep regret the announcement of the death of the Honorable Winston L. Prouty, late a Senator from the State of Vermont.

Resolved, That a committee of Senators be appointed by the President of the Senate to attend the funeral of the deceased.

Resolved, That the Secretary communicate these resolutions to the House of Representatives and transmit an enrolled copy thereof to the family of the deceased.

Resolved, That when the Senate adjourns

today, it adjourn as a further mark of respect to the memory of the deceased Senator.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the resolution was considered and agreed to unanimously.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The second resolution will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read the resolution as follows:

S. RES. 166

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate is hereby authorized and directed to pay from the contingent fund of the Senate the actual and necessary expenses incurred by the committee appointed to arrange for and attend the funeral of the Honorable Winston L. Prouty, late a Senator from the State of Vermont, on vouchers to be approved by the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to consideration of the second resolution?

There being no objection, the resolution was considered and agreed to.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TOMORROW AT 1 P.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, to nail down the schedule for tomorrow, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business tomorrow, it stand in adjournment at no later than 1 p.m.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the order previously entered, the distinguished Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) is recognized for 15 minutes.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 419

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

NOW IS THE TIME FOR TOTAL EXTRICATION

Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, the upcoming presidential election in South Vietnam has become one of the saddest political charades in recent history. As the world looks on in astonishment, the United States is being made an unwilling party to the total destruction of what remained of the democratic process in that unhappy country.

After an endless decade of commitment, this is what we have to show for 55,000 dead American boys, more than a quarter of a million wounded, and expenditure of more than \$100 billion we could not afford.

President Thieu has blatantly and brutally used his power to manipulate South Vietnam's political institutions so as to effectively bar his opponents from competing against him at the polls in October.

Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky has once been disqualified by South Vietnam's Supreme Court.

Gen. Duong Van Minh managed to qualify in spite of the obviously rigged procedures prevailing in this contest. He, too, saw fit to withdraw from the race, claiming, and I believe correctly, that the poll has already been totally rigged from start to finish.

This, then, is what we have come to. Here, then, is all we have to show for all the unmeasurable agony, bloodshed, strife at home, and disgrace abroad of the last 10 years. It is not enough.

One of the main reasons we established a military presence there was to retain for the people of South Vietnam a right of self-determination, secured by free elections. In due course, representative institutions reflecting some sort of parliamentary democracy would be able to take root and grow. We interposed a shield of military might behind which such activities could transpire. It has all been in vain.

The largest circulation paper in my home State of New Mexico, the Albuquerque Journal, has recently spoken out eloquently and persuasively on this subject. This newspaper, along with many of the people of my State, has shown significant forbearance in the past as far as our Vietnam venture is concerned. Their editorial, which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, states the case perceptively and pointedly.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

TIME TO GET OUT—Now

The withdrawal of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky from South Vietnam's Oct. 3 presidential election suggests it is a good time for the U.S. also to withdraw from the Indo-Chinese morass.

We hold no brief for the flamboyant Ky. But his pullout is merely the latest in a series of actions that lends strong credence to his claim that "any election organized by (President Nguyen Van) Thieu would not be an honest election."

Ever since Thieu and Ky were first elected in September 1967 it has been known the two most likely would oppose each other in the 1971 presidential contest. But Thieu, smarting from the fact he received less than a majority (about 35 per cent of the vote) in the 1967 election, seemed determined to gain reelection in 1971 at whatever cost.

Last June he gained National Assembly approval of a measure obviously designed to eliminate any serious opposition. It required a presidential candidate to have his nomination paper signed by 40 deputies and senators or by 100 members of the elected provincial councils. Majorities of both the assembly and councils are controlled by Thieu.

As might have been expected, South Vietnamese's Supreme Court ruled Ky's nomination paper inadequate. Brig. Gen. Duona Van (Big) Minh, however managed to qualify.

But last week Minh withdrew from the race declaring the election already had been rigged. And soon afterward the Supreme Court, unexplicably reversing its earlier decision, ruled that Ky's name could go on the ballot. This apparently was a sop to American officials who expressed dismay about reduction of the field to a single candidate.

But Ky, like Minh, apparently wanted no part of an election in which the ballot-counting could be a mere formality.

Ky has proposed a possible solution to this whole corrupt mess: that he and President Thieu resign so that the speaker of the South Vietnamese senate could assume interim re-

sponsibility for the country and reorganize the next elections.

Since there is little likelihood that the recommendation will be followed we believe it is time to get out of Vietnam. One of the primary reasons for our vast expenditure of blood and treasure was to give the South Vietnamese a chance to choose officials in free elections, but it now is obvious the elections are no longer free.

Mr. MONTROYA. Mr. President, on August 15, as the outlines of this grotesque farce were becoming more sharply defined, I wrote to President Nixon expressing much the same thoughts as are delineated in the Albuquerque Journal editorial. In that missive, I asked the President to seek an end to such activities on the part of President Thieu. In the likely event that there was a negative response to the use of his good offices, I asked him to formally announce a policy of total U.S. military withdrawal from South Vietnam. Such a movement would be undertaken swiftly and result in total extrication of our forces in the shortest possible time. I ask unanimous consent to have a copy of that letter printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the last few days, it has become very clear that President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam has decided to make a shambles of the democratic processes American boys have been fighting to preserve. He is using the power of his office to prevent opponents from challenging him in the upcoming elections.

This is a negation of democracy. It subverts the very purpose for which we have given so much blood over the past decade. What use are our continued sacrifices, if under the umbrella of our protection, President Thieu throttles political competition that is the life blood of the entire democratic process?

The American people are alarmed and dismayed by this sad display. To permit this to continue under our aegis is to prolong the conflict and our involvement in it. To tolerate it further is to make a mockery of all the past sacrifices made by America, including the death of more than 55,000 of our boys.

I urge you to use your good offices to put a stop to this travesty of representative government. If he does not respond to these urgings, it should then be the formally announced policy of the United States Government to withdraw forthwith every remaining American soldier in Vietnam.

I know you share my concern and will act accordingly.

Mr. MONTROYA. Mr. President, it does not take an on-the-scene-observer to see what is happening. We are now reduced to backing an Asian dictatorship of the most blatant sort. It is all the more degrading for us to maintain massive support of this kind of regime, when the entire world can observe with its own eyes the travesty taking place there with our blessing and help.

It is harmful enough to have pursued our previous course. It is worse yet to cling to such a forlorn hope after it is proven beyond any shadow of a doubt that there is no chance for it to bring to fruition even the slimmest and most remote of our expectations.

Yet perhaps the final degradation is for us to frantically cling to Thieu and

his clique in the face of his abrogation of all our publicly stated goals and ideals. We have reached a point where further support for his policies will result in irreparable, far-reaching harm to the long-range interests of the United States.

In light of all these factors and the total picture they reveal to the American public, it is incumbent upon the Congress to do something in the face of the President's obvious reluctance to act accordingly.

Therefore, I shall introduce a measure designed to attain the goal of immediate American withdrawal.

Mr. President, my amendment will require the complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Indochina within 4 months after the date of the presidential election to be held in Vietnam in October. My amendment will allow the President of the United States to make a finding, however, which would assure the Congress that the Republic of Vietnam has followed democratic processes in selection of its president.

The effect of such a finding, submitted by the President to the Congress, would be to nullify the military withdrawal provisions of my measure.

Many in this body have demonstrated their commitment to ending our tragic involvement in Southeast Asia in the form of a land war. I have shared their concern and commitment, and have joined in supporting those measures which have been offered by Senators McGOVERN, HATFIELD, COOPER, CHURCH, and our distinguished majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD. It is not my intention in offering the present legislative measure to in any way subtract from the initiative and leadership demonstrated by my colleagues. I only want to contribute to our collective efforts to terminate a conflict that has divided this Nation and diverted it from attaining vital national goals.

Mr. President, every American understands the tragedy surrounding those service personnel who are held in prisoner of war as a result of this conflict. My measure does not advocate in any form that we abandon our prisoners of war; rather, I am firmly convinced that this amendment contains an intelligent and well-reasoned approach to this complex aspect of our involvement in Southeast Asia.

With enactment of this measure, Congress would be on record directing the President to negotiate the release of our prisoners of war, and to withdraw our military forces in concert with their release by North Vietnam and the Vietcong. Such a withdrawal would be completed within 4 months after the end of the South Vietnamese elections.

Mr. President, no constitutional arguments can be made against my amendment. Under article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has power to appropriate funds for military purposes, as well as to declare war. Neither is the President being pressured to do anything faster than he had already indicated a desire to do previously. January 1972, as a withdrawal date, is already later than the target he favored for withdrawal in 1969. To those who may claim there is no

JAN 10, 1971

precedent for such an amendment as this, there is another more than adequate response. No situation has ever demanded such action on the part of Congress. While Presidential action is, of course, preferred, particularly in light of the genesis of this military action, when it is not forthcoming, it is the obligation of Congress to supply such an initiative.

Mr. President, in no way is this amendment and the action I am requesting an abrogation or erosion of the Commander in Chief's executive authority. Rather, it is in direct line with our often expressed reasons for involvement in Indochina. We entered that conflict to preserve for those people the right of self-determination. Representative institutions and free elections have consistently been the justifications for our presence in South Vietnam. Now we are putting the Saigon regime on notice that either past sacrifices are vindicated in the form of free elections, or we shall forthwith totally remove our military support.

To conclude, Mr. President, let me remind my colleagues that we should not expect the ideals of this Nation to withstand our continued support of dictatorial regimes. None of us in this Chamber can take comfort from our tragic history in Vietnam, but all of us share in the responsibility for our Nation's involvement. Now, an additional circumstance has been added to the equation—the total absence of the democratic processes we have at great human cost attempted to give life to in Indochina. The costs of our involvement in Southeast Asia need not be repeated, but our unresponsiveness to the tragedy must not be forgotten.

Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment to the military procurement authorization bill and ask that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 419

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

SEC. 505. (a) The purpose of this section is to reaffirm the position of the United States Government with respect to the establishment of democratic processes of government in South Vietnam. Congress declares that United States military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam has consistently been founded on the concept of free and open elections. These elections should allow meaningful opponents to qualify as candidates, guarantee fair and open competition among these candidates, protect campaign workers from harassment and intimidation by opponents, the government, or private interests, and guarantee that voters are allowed to freely exercise their franchise. This has been the stated policy of the United States Government for many years.

(b) Funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law to support the deployment of United States Armed Forces in or the conduct of United States military operations in or over Indochina may not be expended beyond four months after the date of the completion of the 1971 presidential elections of the Republic of Vietnam, unless the President submits within 15 days following such election a report to the Congress finding that:

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of the President to:

(1) provide for the safety of American armed forces during their withdrawal from Indochina;

(2) arrange asylum or other means of protection for South Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians who might be physically endangered by the withdrawal of American armed forces, or

(3) to provide assistance to the nations of Indochina, in amounts approved by the Congress, consistent with the objectives of this section.

(d) The Congress hereby urges and requests the President to negotiate with the government of North Vietnam for an agreement which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United States military forces from Indochina in exchange for a corresponding series of phased releases of American prisoners of war and for the release of any remaining American prisoners of war concurrently with the withdrawal of all remaining military forces of the United States by not later than the date established in subsection (b) of this section.

(e) This section shall not be construed to affect the Constitutional power of the President as Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial published in the New York Times on September 13, 1971, entitled "Last Chance In Vietnam," and an article which was published in the New York Times on September 13, 1971, entitled "Strain of the Vietnam War Weakens Army Elsewhere."

There being no objection, the editorial and the article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 1971]

LAST CHANCE IN VIETNAM

Two authoritative voices now have challenged the Administration's hand-wringing act over the political crisis in Vietnam and its claims that it has done all it can to influence President Thieu to turn his single-state presidential "election" into a real contest.

The threat by Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington to vote against further economic or military aid to Saigon unless the Administration prevails upon General Thieu to hold a genuine election indicates the distress felt by long-time supporters of United States policy in Vietnam.

South Vietnam's Supreme Court and its National Assembly could constitutionally reopen the race to other candidates, if General Thieu requested action. The Nixon Administration, Senator Jackson said, "should stop pretending to be helpless, saying there is nothing more to be done." The United States, he added, "still has sufficient influence in Vietnam to see that a pointless referendum is transformed into a meaningful political contest—if necessary, at a later date."

This assertion has now been verified by none other than President Thieu himself in an interview given shortly before the Jackson statement but published fortuitously at about the same time. As reported by columnist Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, South Vietnam's President said he could not stand up against an American threat to cut off aid. He disclosed that he had informed South Vietnam's generals that he would resign if the United States Government or Congress cut off aid because of his one-man race for re-election. "We need military assistance to conduct our self-defense," General Thieu said.

There have been other indications of concern within the military junta that rules South Vietnam. But none could be more conclusive than President Thieu's own revela-

tion of the assurances of readiness to quit he felt it necessary to give his colleagues.

The Thieu and Jackson statements refute the Administration's denials of responsibility for the electoral farce now under way in Saigon. Mr. Nixon's failure to intervene to assure the people of South Vietnam an opportunity to choose their own government undermines the moral basis for claims by four American Presidents to justify intervention in Vietnam's civil war.

But Mr. Nixon is not the ultimate arbiter, as the Jackson and Thieu statements demonstrate. A firm position by Congress, making further aid conditional on a fair and contested presidential election in South Vietnam, undoubtedly would set such a contest in motion. What is essential is a three-way race including Vice President Ky and General Duong Van Minh, who is the candidate of the Buddhists and other major opposition forces in South Vietnam. Both Air Marshal Ky and General Minh undoubtedly would re-enter the campaign if adequate machinery for joint and impartial supervision of the election were established by mutual agreement.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 1971]

STRAIN OF THE VIETNAM WAR WEAKENS ARMY ELSEWHERE

(By B. Drummond Ayres, Jr.)

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12.—The tremendous strain placed on the United States Army by the Vietnam war has left many of its units that are stationed elsewhere not only demoralized but also unfit for heavy combat.

Officials here say that at least nine of the 11 divisions on active duty outside Southeast Asia are incapable of waging immediate, full-scale war because of manpower and training shortcomings.

Out in the field, at places like Fort Carson, Colo., and Grafenwoehr, West Germany, unit commanders worry about what might happen "if the balloons goes up."

"I'm afraid we're quite a long way from the early nineteen-sixties, when we were about as good as an Army can get," says Maj. Gen. Donnelly P. Bolton, a Defense Department specialist in unit readiness.

The best prepared of the Army's divisions are still tied down in Vietnam—the 101st Airborne and the 23d Infantry. But even these units, which give the Army a total strength of 13 divisions and about a million men, are beginning to have trouble as the war grinds down and boredom and restlessness set in.

The two divisions outside Vietnam that also have combat ready ratings are the 82d Airborne and the 1st Mechanized. But they, too, have certain important limitations.

For example, the 82d can move quickly from its base at Fort Bragg, N. C., but it is a lightly armed division.

As for the 1st, it is a divided unit, with some of its troops stationed at Fort Riley, Kan., and others in Germany.

Of the nine Army divisions rated and unfit for immediate, full-scale combat, several—such as the Third Armored in Germany and the Second Infantry in Korea—are capable of strong holding actions, though not for long periods. These units have most of their troops but need at least six months up to first-class condition.

Other divisions with bad fitness reports, such as the Fourth Mechanized at Fort Carson and the 25th Infantry in Hawaii, are incapable even of holding actions. They are at least a year and a half from combat readiness.

MORALE PROBLEMS CITED

"About all we can do is stay ahead of our paperwork," says Maj. Nicholas Waddock, a Fourth Division officer whose battalion is at half strength.

While the unpreparedness within divisions like the Fourth stems mainly from shortages

in manpower and training, morale and disciplinary problems caused by the unpopularity of the war and the draft have aggravated the situation. So, too, have race and drug problems.

The deterioration in readiness began about five years ago when the Johnson Administration, taking politics and economics into consideration, decided to expand the Vietnam fighting force without calling up the inactive reserves and without huge draft levies.

This meant that men and equipment had to be siphoned from divisions stationed elsewhere, such as Korea and Germany.

As the war has slowed, most of the equipment has been returned. But because of continuing political and economic pressures, many of the men coming back have been discharged rather than sent to units short of troops.

Only recently has the flow been diverted.

RETRAINING NEEDED

For instance, early this year many of the battalions and brigades in the four divisions in Germany were down to 60 and 70 per cent of their fighting strength. Since then, however, thousands of replacements have been shipped to Europe, and now the divisions there are up to about 90 per cent of fighting strength.

Still, many of the new men must be retrained. Some units have too many infantrymen and not enough mechanics; others have too many mechanics and not enough infantrymen.

And even after the European divisions have reached full strength and trained individual soldiers in the required specialties, units must be trained as a whole—first at company level, then at battalion and brigade levels and finally at division level.

In the last five years, few Army units other than those headed for Vietnam have conducted much training above battalion level.

Some of the Army divisions stationed in the United States have not yet benefited substantially from the new troop replacement effort. Among these are the 25th in Hawaii, the Second Armored at Fort Hood, Tex., and Fort Carson's Fourth Mechanized.

The Fourth has an authorized strength of 17,000 men but has only 11,000, and a disproportionate number of them are officers and sergeants.

MANY ARE EMBITTERED

Thus companies are down to 25 to 40 per cent of their fighting strength. Also, one of every three men is trained in an unneeded military specialty, and one of every two men is a Vietnam returnee, a "short-timer" with less than six months to serve.

The Army says that shorttimers seldom acquire any sense of belonging to the Fourth. Many have been embittered by Vietnam and the draft and are willing to soldier only enough to get by until their discharge arrives.

Because it has a large number of returnees, the Fourth turns over about 15 per cent of its strength every month, about double the turnover rate for the rest of the Army.

"Things are so bad here," says Capt. Kenneth King, a company commander, "that we've had to put some of our vehicles and weapons in storage. We try to train one day a week. The rest of the time we just keep house."

Even divisions rated as combat-ready have problems with turnover and returnees. At Fort Riley, Col. R. D. Tice, commander of a First Mechanized Brigade, says:

"We've got all our people. But until the war is over they're going to be coming and going so much that we're not going to be as good as we should be."

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the order previously entered the dis-

tinguished Senator from Georgia is recognized for 15 minutes.

THE TEXTILE-IMPORT PROBLEM

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, while I was home last week, we received sad news that the second largest single industrial employer in the State of Georgia will close four of its plants which employ 1,100 people.

The Bibb Manufacturing Co., which has 23 plants in Georgia, announced that a combination of poor business conditions and low-wage import competition were forcing the closing of plants in Macon, Columbus, and Porterdale. Thus, by the end of November, these 1,100 people—who comprise 15 percent of the Bibb Manufacturing Co. work force—will be out of their present jobs.

The Bibb closings were the largest of many which have occurred in Georgia in the past 2 years. The fact is, 17 plants have shut down since 1968, leaving thousands of textile workers to seek other jobs, unemployment compensation, or even face the prospect of having to go on welfare.

The Department of Labor continues to report a serious decline in textile employment in Georgia and throughout the Southeast. In 1 month alone, from June to July of this year, textile employment in the Southeast fell 7,000—with 900 of those jobs being lost in the State of Georgia.

I and other Senators who are equally concerned about this problem have come before the Senate time and time again pointing out that many of these job losses can be traced directly to unfair import competition from the low-wage countries of the Orient. Bibb Manufacturing, for example, produces yarns for carpets and twill. The Japanese have been underselling them in both lines. Imports have taken over more than half of the domestic market for worsted materials for men's suits. They have 25 percent of the overall apparel market.

One does not have to be drawn a picture to see that this type of penetration cannot occur without American working people being thrown out of a job.

Imports currently are running at an annual level of 6 billion square yards. This is more than double what they were 5 years ago. This represents a displacement of the equivalent of 300,000 American jobs.

We hear a good deal from the Japanese about their highly touted, but I submit virtually useless, unilateral controls on textile imports. They would have us believe that the U.S. Government has no business limiting textile imports. They say let Japan do it. They say let the Japanese Textile Federation dictate what kinds and the amounts of textiles that can be sold in this country. They say there is no need to impose quotas on imports. Japanese claim they will themselves use "self-restraint."

I say, what kind of self-restraint can we expect from the Japanese when we look at what has been happening in the last 10 years? It is still happening, Japanese and other Far East imports con-

tinue to glut the American market. American workers continue to find their jobs pulled out from under them, while the Nation's unemployment rate goes sky high.

Our overall trade deficit last year with Japan was about \$1.8 billion, and it appears that it will increase by another \$1 billion this year.

Mr. President, I think the Congress ought to serve notice on the Japanese here and now that this problem must be solved, and it must be solved now. If they are not willing to negotiate in a spirit of fair play and equity for the American textile workers, Congress has no choice but to take the matter in hand. In fact, Congress should have acted a long time ago. For years we have been talking about the problem. We have talked and tried to negotiate voluntary agreements. All the while, textile imports have driven people out of work and, at the same time, we go lamenting the high rate of unemployment.

The time for talk is over. The time to act is now. We have had enough mill closings. We have had more than enough joblessness. We have heard too much tough talk from the exporting countries about what they are going to do if we attempt to protect our basic job producing industries from total destruction. As the President said Thursday in his economic address to Congress, the time is long overdue for the United States to put our own interests first.

It was most ironic to return to Washington to find a Japanese cabinet delegation here "talking tough" on the international trade issue. In the September 9 edition of the Washington Post, Japan's Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda attacked the 10-percent surtax on imports that has been imposed by President Nixon. He threatened retaliatory action if the import tax is not promptly removed.

In the same issue of the Washington Post, the presidents of four textile and apparel unions signed an advertisement pointing out that in the first 7 months of this year imports of Japanese textiles and apparel are 43 percent higher than last year's all-time record level.

With the United States plagued by serious economic problems, many of which are the direct result of our outdated and overly liberal trade policies, one would think that the Japanese would come to this country in a more conciliatory frame of mind.

Rather than coming over here to complain about the surtax and threaten retaliation, the Japanese should be talking about what can be done to correct this intolerable textile-import situation.

The import surcharge and an upward revaluation of the yen, if it is revalued high enough, can be significant steps to correcting our general balance-of-trade problems.

But, the surcharge is just a stop gap measure designed to get our general trade picture into better balance. It will have little effect on the long standing and seriously deteriorating textile trade situation. As far as Japanese and oriental textiles are concerned, the 10-percent surcharge is like trying to treat cancer

(1) the Republic of Vietnam has followed democratic processes in the selection of its president allowing a freely contested election; and (2) the procedures used in such election guaranteed the rights of campaign workers and protected the franchise of the people of South Vietnam; and (3) such election was conducted in a manner consistent with the purposes of the United States efforts on behalf of the Republic of Vietnam as defined in subsection (a) of this section.